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Democratic governance is premised on the belief that all citizens 
are empowered to shape the society in which they live. Over 
generations, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples have 
maintained that Australian democratic practice does not live up 
to this ideal, contending that the state’s legal and political 
framework does not empower them with the capacity to have 
their voices heard and their interests considered in the processes 
of government. However, non-Indigenous Australians remain 
suspicious of Indigenous-specific political and legal mechanisms 
designed to rectify this structural fault. In this paper, I argue that 
this suspicion – and Australia’s governance framework more 
broadly – arises from a particular conception of democratic 
theory that marginalises Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
peoplehood. If, as the Uluru Statement from the Heart calls for, 
Australia’s political institutions are to be rebuilt so as to empower 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders ‘to take a rightful place in 
[their] own country’, that conception of democratic theory must 
first be revealed and re-centred. Multinational federalism offers 





In May 2017, around 250 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander delegates from ‘all points of 
the southern sky’ gathered on the red dust of Mutitjulu to call for meaningful reform to 
Australia’s democratic institutions.1 The largest and most comprehensive process of 
deliberative constitutional debate in the country’s history, the Uluru Statement from the Heart 
echoes and extends generations of Indigenous advocacy. For over a century, Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander peoples have challenged Australia’s political and legal governance 
framework, contending that it fails to substantively recognise their normative distinctiveness 
and fails to accommodate their aspirations. As part of this political activism, Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander peoples have frequently asserted that ‘democracy has failed’ them,2 or 
that democracy ‘just does not work to enable the solution of our problems’.3 Is democracy the 
problem?  
 
In this article, I argue that democracy is not the problem; Australian democratic practice is. 
Democratic theorists recognise the necessity of counter-majoritarian mechanisms to restrain 
untrammelled majorities as well as to empower minority groups who are unable to protect 
themselves in majoritarian processes.4 The problem is that in Australia, these counter-
majoritarian mechanisms are not structured along cleavages relevant for Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander peoples. This is because Australia’s political and legal governance framework 
is built on a unitary conception of the demos that obscures the challenges faced by numerically 
small, distinct, normative communities seeking to have their interests considered in the 
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processes of government. I argue that recognition that Australia is a plurinational state, 
consisting of multiple peoples, is key to devising and constructing appropriate legal and 
political institutions and processes to empower Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples 
in a manner consistent with democratic values. 
 
The argument is carried out in two parts. Part II explains that Australian democratic practice is 
largely premised on the idea of a ‘culturally homogenous nation’.5 Within the Australian 
community, the formal political resources are, in theory at least, distributed equally; all persons 
are members of a ‘single-status community’,6 enjoying undifferentiated citizenship rights. 
Formal political equality secures important democratic outcomes, but it can also promote a 
false dichotomy between equality and difference that, in Australia, operates to deny the 
peoplehood status of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders.7 As I argue, this ‘intellectual 
construction’,8 has informed the design of a governance framework that fails to empower 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. 
 
In Part III, I reconstruct Australian democratic practice by re-centring it on Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander peoplehood. Grounding our political and legal governance framework on 
the fact that multiple normative orders exist within the state leads us to consider institutional 
arrangements that more equitably distribute political power in a manner consistent with 
democratic ideals. Many democratic states across the globe are increasingly acknowledging 
that the Indigenous polities whose land they claim are entitled to a measure of political power 
and are consequently developing or recognising institutions of self-rule for Indigenous political 
communities within an overarching framework of shared-rule. Difficult questions concerning 
the boundaries of Indigenous polities, as well as the delineation of legal authority and political 
responsibility persist, but democratic theory points towards a more equitable, albeit contested, 
solution. 
 
Before commencing this project, however, two preliminary points are necessary. First, 
exploring Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples’ constitutional or political relationship 
with the Australian state under the lens of democratic theory is justifiable only if Indigenous 
Australians do not desire to secede. This appears to be the case. Despite several prominent 
figures advocating for stronger forms of autonomy,9 many Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
people appear to seek reform of, rather than outside, the state. As the Uluru Statement from the 
Heart confirmed, many Indigenous Australians desire ‘substantive constitutional change and 
structural reform’ so that their ‘ancient sovereignty can shine through as a fuller expression of 
Australia’s nationhood’ and that they make take ‘a rightful place in [their] own country’.10 As 
explained at Uluru, sovereignty is not a legal concept but ‘a spiritual notion’,11 predicated on 
Indigenous Australians’ ancestral ties to land and community. Assertions of Indigenous 
sovereignty therefore do not necessarily call for legal secession but for meaningful institutional 
change to embed a constitutional relationship built on equal partnership and equal political 
status. 
 
Second, democratic theory is an especially useful framework of analysis because the reforms 
expressed in the Uluru Statement are multifaceted and intimately connected to democratic 
ideals. In calling for a First Nations Voice to advise the federal Parliament, Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander peoples reveal their aspirations for institutional reform that empowers 
them to be heard in processes of shared decision-making. In also calling for a Makarrata 
Commission to supervise a process of agreement-making and truthtelling, Indigenous 
Australians documented their desire that the state carve out legal space for distinct Indigenous 
communities to make their own decisions. These reforms are aimed at developing quasi-federal 
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institutional arrangements. In this sense, they are ‘the fulfilment of a greater democracy’,12 
aimed at empowering Indigenous peoples with the capacity to have a say in government in a 
manner that allows them to impose a direction on that government,13 so they may ‘shape the 
social context in which they live’.14 
 
II. Australian democratic practice 
 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples were historically excluded from the Australian 
polity. Indigenous peoples played no meaningful role in the drafting of the Constitution,15 
which expressly discriminated against them;16 formal prohibitions on the franchise were in 
place until 1962,17 and it was not until 1967 that symbolic and practical constitutional 
exclusions were excised. These important reforms opened the Australian demos to Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander peoples and contributed to a more inclusive understanding of 
Australian identity. However, they have proven insufficient to empower Indigenous 
Australians because they were not accompanied by formal recognition of Indigenous normative 
distinctiveness nor institutional arrangements to give such distinctiveness political or 
constitutional force.18 Consequently, prevailing social and political attitudes that initially 
excluded Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples are today reflected in a legal governance 
framework that fails to empower Indigenous Australians with the capacity to have their voices 
heard and their interests considered in the processes of Australian government. 
 
A. The unitary demos 
 
Marginalisation and denial of Indigenous normative distinctiveness is interlinked with 
Australian conceptions of democracy. As Megan Davis has argued rejection of Indigenous 
difference arises from the ‘utilitarian ethic’19 that dwells within Australia’s sense of 
egalitarianism and that marks anything ‘special’ as necessarily ‘violating the sameness that is 
at the core of the national identity’.20 These logics also lay behind Prime Minister John 
Howard’s persistent refusal to contemplate negotiating a treaty with Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander peoples, for as he explained, ‘a united undivided nation does not make a treaty 
with itself’.21 Implicit in Howard’s rejection of treaty-making is a particular understanding of 
democracy that operates as the premise for Australia’s political and legal governance 
framework. For Howard, Australia is composed of a single people.22 That is, despite the 
multiplicity of citizens within the polity, as an ‘imagined community’,23 a ‘presumed 
homogeneity’24 permeates Australian society. Because all members of the polity are members 
of a single community, ‘no group…should have rights that are not enjoyed by another group’.25 
 
Assertions of Indigenous difference challenge the unitary demos and its difference-blind 
treatment of equality. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples argue that their status as 
prior, self-governing normative communities who have never ceded sovereignty distinguish 
themselves from other citizens of the state.26 They contend that they are not simply ethnic or 
cultural minority groups, but polities with concomitant rights entitled to a distinctive 
institutional relationship with the state. This status is reflected in international soft law 
instruments; the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), 
for instance, endorsed by Australia in 2009, affirms Indigenous peoples distinctive character, 
adopting a multinational ordering of the state.27 This status is also reflected in some domains 
in Australia. As Dylan Lino has explained, the Australian state has legally recognised the 
peoplehood of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders in three major forms: the establishment 
of distinct entitlements to land;28 protection of cultural heritage;29 and the emergence of an 
Indigenous sector to ‘represent, deliver services to and manage land for Aboriginal and Torres 
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Strait Islander peoples’.30 However, while these legislative and political advances suggest that 
Australian democracy is capable of recognising group claims in many practical ways, these 
successes are only partial; this distinctive status is not recognised more fundamentally in 
Australia’s political and legal institutions. 
 
Australia’s democratic institutions do not specifically empower Indigenous peoples to be 
heard. Rather, reflecting a conception of formal equality consistent with the existence of a 
singular people, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples enjoy the same opportunities and 
responsibilities as all Australian citizens. Among other democratic rights, Indigenous 
Australians may stand for Parliament, freely discuss political and governmental matters, and 
assemble and associate for that purpose. Although Indigenous peoples constitute a numerical 
minority within the Australian state, a complex public law framework is intended to 
appropriately balance the value of democratic rule against the danger of de Tocqueville’s 
‘tyranny of the majority’. Political power is divided horizontally across a bicameral parliament 
and vertically via division of competencies between the federal government and eight states 
and self-governing territories, while the judiciary is empowered to check legislative and 
executive action in certain areas. Together, this institutional framework is expected to provide 
all citizens with ‘an equal share in political power’.31 
 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people consistently maintain, however, that this 
framework, and Australian democratic practice, does not provide them with an ‘equal share in 
the political life of the community’.32 Australia’s system of governance is ‘built upon 
confidence in a system of parliamentary’ representation,33 but demographics, electoral system 
design, and political practice challenge Indigenous Australians’ capacity to elect 
representatives of their choice. When combined with the absence of comprehensive rights 
protections or a requirement that government ‘listen to Indigenous peoples before passing laws 
that affect [them]’,34 the result is a government largely ‘not accountable to Indigenous 
peoples’.35 Overall, Australian democratic institutions generally do not protect Indigenous 
peoples from majority rule, nor empower them to shape the social context in which they live. 
 
Institutional reform is necessary to rectify this breach of democratic values. However, the 
underlying conception of democracy that operates in Australia leads non-Indigenous 
Australians to view Indigenous-specific political and legal processes and institutions aimed at 
remedying Indigenous marginalisation with suspicion. For example, the question of reserved 
seats in parliament for Indigenous Australians has periodically been examined by 
parliamentary and expert bodies. Although the New Zealand Parliament has included dedicated 
seats for Māori people since 1867,36 (and added provisions to increase their number in 1993),37 
no Australian report has recommended its adoption. Rather, concerns are frequently noted that 
the community considers the idea of reserved seats ‘undemocratic’.38 More recently, Prime 
Minister Malcolm Turnbull echoed these concerns in rejecting the proposals of the Uluru 
Statement from the Heart. In a press release, Turnbull explained that ‘our democracy is built 
on the foundation of all Australian citizens having equal civic rights’, and that a constitutionally 
enshrined Indigenous representative body empowered to advise the Parliament would 
‘undermine the universal principles of unity, equality and “one person one vote”’.39 
 
This underlying conception of democracy manifests in various guises. In 2007, it animated the 
reasons given by representatives of Australia, Canada, Aotearoa/New Zealand and the United 
States for refusing to adopt the UNDRIP. Representatives from Australia and Canada remarked 
that they could not accept an instrument that would ‘apply a standard for Indigenous peoples 
that does not apply to others in the population’, for allowing ‘a particular subgroup of the 
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population to be able to veto legitimate decisions of a democratic and representative 
government’40 is ‘fundamentally incompatible with [our] parliamentary system’.41 Similarly, 
the Aotearoa/New Zealand representative explained they were unable to support articles in the 
Declaration that implied ‘different classes of citizenship’ or that ‘Indigenous peoples have 
rights that others do not have’.42 In a separate statement, Robert Hagan, the United States 
representative, declared that while the United States ‘strongly support the full participation of 
Indigenous peoples in democratic decision-making processes’ it ‘cannot accept the notion of a 
sub-national group having a “veto” power over the legislative process’.43 Each nation has since 
adopted the Declaration, and while their initial demurrer may have been more complicated,44 
their statements remain telling. 
 
Similar concerns catalysed opposition to the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission 
(ATSIC). Operating between 1990 and 2005, ATSIC delivered limited, but real authority to 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people. As a nationally representative body with 
executive powers, Indigenous representatives could identify funding priorities, formulate and 
implement regional plans, make decisions over public expenditure, protect cultural material 
and information, and speak directly to the government.45 As such, its existence served as an 
acknowledgment that public policy affecting Indigenous Australians should not be devised and 
implemented by the Australian population as a whole but by those affected by it. Consequently, 
the Commission directly challenged the dominant narrative of Australian democracy, inviting 
virulent criticism. During debate on the ATSIC Bill in 1989, for instance, Opposition Leader 
John Howard condemned the Commission as ‘a monumental disservice to the Australian 
community’ which ‘strikes at the heart of the unity of the Australian people’.46 Other members 
of the Opposition adopted similar attacks, criticising the proposed body as a ‘black 
parliament’,47 which ‘smacks of separatism of the worst possible kind in a nation’.48 
 
This language periodically reappeared in debate over ATSIC throughout its life and ultimately 
served as a justification for its eventual abolition in 2005.49 In announcing this decision, Prime 
Minister Howard declared that the ‘the experiment in separate representation, elected 
representation, for Indigenous people has been a failure’.50 Standing beside him, Amanda 
Vanstone, the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs defended the 
decision, noting that ‘there was once a country we wouldn’t play cricket with because they had 
separate systems’.51 Later that year, Vanstone again gave voice to the prevailing conception of 
Australian democracy, remarking in an address to the Bennelong Society that ‘for too long we 
have let ideological positions like self-determination prevent governments from engaging with 
their Indigenous citizens’.52 For Vanstone, the Commission – and the very notion of Indigenous 
difference – demarcated Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples from other Australians 
in a manner incompatible with democracy. 
 
Australian democracy is built (and maintained) on an account that assumes the polity 
constitutes a single national community.53 This conception contends that the view that 
Indigenous Australians might be differentiated from other members of the state, and 
consequently, might have different rights and obligations is ‘fundamentally incompatible’ with 
democracy. It is this understanding that catalysed opposition to ATSIC, lay behind Australia’s 
refusal to endorse the UNDRIP in 2007, and continues to challenge putative Indigenous-
specific mechanisms today. As I argue below, this understanding has led to a governance 
framework that fails to empower Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, contributing to 
the ‘torment of [their] powerlessness’.54 
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B. The misguided institutional framework 
 
The boundaries of the possible are set in advance by the parameters of our imagination. It is no 
surprise then that the subconscious supposition of a ‘monistic demos’55 grounds certain 
philosophical presumptions within Australian democratic practice and, consequently, the 
political and legal institutions and processes that structure the operation of Australian 
governance. Indigenous peoplehood may have been recognised in several ways and the 
Australian citizenry may be less homogenous than it historically has been, but, as Aileen 
Moreton-Robinson has noted, ‘the dominant institutions such as law and government, and their 
epistemologies, remain anglicised’.56 In this section, I explore three consequences for 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples that follow from the prevailing conception of 
democracy that operates in Australia. 
 
First, the assumption that within Australia resides one unified national community affects the 
formulation of citizenship rights and duties, which apply equally to all citizens irrespective of 
their identity. While securing the valuable democratic goal of equal citizenship, the application 
of this formally neutral vision of justice and fairness can ‘serve to overlook deeply imbalanced 
relations of power’ between peoples within the state.57 Indeed, incorporating distinct peoples 
into a larger undifferentiated mass of formally equal citizens does not negate the reality of 
contestation (and potentially domination) between different polities, but it does ensure that 
state institutions and mechanisms are blind to this fact. As such, institutional forms to guard 
against the formation of, or specifically empower, a persistent electoral minority may be 
absent.58 
 
The extension of the franchise to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples serves as an 
appropriate example. Clearly, removing discriminatory legislation and ensuring that ‘everyone 
who is affected by the decisions of a government [has the] right to participate in that 
government’,59 secured democratic goals. But, in the absence of legal or political institutions 
or processes to recognise the distinctive status of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, 
at what cost were democratic goals secured? The extension of the franchise and its compulsory 
application ‘usurped’ Indigenous polities, swallowing them up into a larger state that negates 
the reality of their status as prior self-governing communities,60 erasing the existence of ‘shared 
membership in separate or overlapping polities’.61 In a process that Ephraim Nimni terms 
‘assimilation with democracy as compensation’,62 the extension of the franchise welcomed 
Indigenous peoples into a form of governance based upon majority rule and predicated on 
participation as atomistic individuals. Comprising only 3 per cent of the total population and 
territorially dispersed across the political unit, the formal non-recognition of normative 
difference ensures that – notwithstanding their equal right to speak, protest, and vote – 
Indigenous Australians will struggle to be heard via democratic mechanisms.63 
 
The failure to question the unitary demos assumption frames past ‘exclusion’ from the body 
politic as the sole problem of justice facing previously excluded groups. Thus, inclusion is 
perceived as the necessary remedy.64 This may be appropriate for many groups, including 
women and the propertyless, but it is in tension where civil rights or civic inclusion projects 
interact with groups who consider themselves a distinct people. As the significantly lagging 
registration and participation levels of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples in 
Australian elections indicates,65 for such groups, inclusion in the civic project is necessary but 
not sufficient, for the civil rights project cannot address issues of competing sovereignties.66 
Simply put, for many Indigenous peoples, equal rights within an undifferentiated community 
constitutes a denial of their distinctive status.  
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Second, a belief that the Australian polity constitutes a shared national community leads to a 
view that the potentially destructive effects of majoritarian mechanisms are somewhat 
mitigated, or unlikely to eventuate. Where the citizens of a state share a deep sense of 
belonging, solidarity can be expected notwithstanding that some group of voters is in a minority 
and their policy preferences are not enacted. This assumption is inherent in John Rawls’ 
privileging of a shared conception of justice as the foundation for unity in modern societies. 
For Rawls, although a ‘well-ordered society is divided and pluralistic’ and therefore cannot 
achieve agreement in all things, ‘the public agreement on questions of political and social 
justice supports ties of civic friendship and secures the bonds of association’.67 Indeed, despite 
their electoral loss, in the United Kingdom members of Her Majesty’s Loyal Opposition remain 
‘firmly part of the demos’,68 anxious to ensure their alienation from the government benches is 
only temporary. 
 
This same assumption leads many theorists to contend that persistent electoral minority groups 
do not exist. Majority rule is entirely unproblematic because ‘constantly shifting constellations 
of various minority interests’69 will coalesce around certain issues before breaking apart and 
rearranging themselves on other points, and we therefore all take turns ruling and being ruled. 
As only a ‘fanatic or a compulsive neurotic’70 places stock in a single group affiliation, counter-
majoritarian institutions need not cleave so closely to such distinctions. In plurinational states 
like Australia, however, this basic sense of shared identity cannot be presumed and, therefore, 
may not compensate recurrent or persistent electoral defeats on issues that strike at the heart of 
a people who consider themselves, in some part, separate from the dominant community.71 
While persistent electoral defeats do not inexorably lead to civil strife or insurrection they can 
further weaken bonds of solidarity, dissolving social and institutional trust. For many 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, the very legitimacy of the presently constituted 
Australian state is at issue. In these circumstances, public agreement on political justice cannot 
be taken for granted and solidarity cannot be expected. Institutional design must be sensitive 
to this fact. 
 
Finally, a failure to appreciate relevant distinctions means Australia’s democratic institutions 
mischaracterise diversity as always cultural rather than sometimes national. Consequently, our 
counter-majoritarian mechanisms are not designed for plurinational politics, but pluricultural 
or pluralist ones. That is, they appreciate pluralism within a single Australian community, but 
not the pluralism of multiple peoples within the state. For instance, while only the Australian 
Capital Territory and Victoria have enacted statutory bills of rights,72 efforts are mobilising to 
pass similar bills in other jurisdictions.73 These are positive developments, but it is important 
to be clear-eyed about their potential. Although the logics of human rights instruments may 
support some Indigenous aspirations,74 they only stretch so far.75 In framing the legal limits of 
government action, human rights instruments regulate state power rather than challenge it, and 
they are not suitable mechanism to recognise the distinctive status of a people.76  
 
Federalism may sometimes operate as a counter-narrative to the construction of a unitary 
demos during constitutive periods, but this was not the case here. In Australia, the division of 
competencies was premised on an understanding of federalism that sees political subunits as 
primarily historically derived administrative arrangements, rather than a flexible means to 
accommodate the democratic rights of multiple peoples. Australia’s states and territories are 
predominantly creatures of managerial ease, arising from the difficulty in exercising control 
and governance over a continent in the nineteenth century. While each colony contained 
significant ethnocultural pluralism,77 each ‘demos’ was regarded as – and via coercive 
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measures, designed to be – one and the same. This central fact was recognised by the future 
Australian Prime Minister Alfred Deakin, in his response to the then South Australian Premier 
Charles Kingston at the Federal Convention Debates at Melbourne in 1890: 
 
The honourable gentleman seemed to imply that there would always be the same 
separateness existing between the residents of the Australian Colonies as there may be 
between the residents of adjoining but differing nationalities. We have, however, to 
recollect that we have sprung from one stock and are one people, and whatever the 
barriers between us may be, they are of our own creation. That which we have created 
we are surely strong enough to remove.78 
 
Deakin’s understanding of Australian unity was shared by many – if not all – of the delegates. 
Famously, at a Federation Conference Banquet in 1890, Henry Parkes, the ‘Father of 
Federation’, characterised the relationship of the peoples of the colonies as bound together by 
a ‘crimson thread of kinship’.79 
 
Invocations of blood may no longer feature in mainstream accounts of Australian identity but 
the failure to recognise diverse peoples within the state has left Australian federalism somewhat 
inchoate. Indeed, as William Riker remarked, ‘one wonders indeed why they bother with 
federalism in Australia’.80 In recent years, however, scholarly work has proposed ways to 
reconceptualise our ‘territorial’ understanding of federalism into a ‘multinational’ approach.81 
For example, Michael Mansell has advocated the establishment of an Aboriginal State within 
the Australian federation, comprising of existing Indigenous landholdings,82 while Dylan Lino 
has explored how this institutional mechanism may offer a ‘valuable conceptual language’ for 
framing Indigenous peoplehood claims.83 Notwithstanding these impressive and innovative 
efforts, there appears little political appetite to progress alternative conceptions. Federalism in 
Australia remains wedded to A. V. Dicey’s contention that ‘an impress of common nationality’ 
is necessary.84 This is problematic. A multinational account of federalism offers many 
advantages, including the potential to anchor Indigenous and non-Indigenous polities within 
an overarching shared framework based on a robust democratic constitutional system that 
divides powers equitably between distinct polities. Such an approach could thus provide the 
building blocks for mechanisms designed to empower Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
peoples in a manner consistent with democratic ideals.85 Multinational federalism in Australia 
is only possible, however, if we jettison prevailing understanding of Australian democracy and 
recognise Indigenous political communities as ‘an equal partner in the state’.86  
 
III. Re-centring Australian democratic practice 
 
Australia’s democratic institutions are built on exclusion. The Australian Constitution imposed 
a foreign system of law and government, displacing diverse normative orders across the 
continent with a single legal framework that cast Indigenous peoples out of the ‘constitutional 
community’.87 Law reform may have since welcomed Indigenous peoples into the Australian 
polity, but their inclusion was not accompanied by meaningful amendment to the framework 
of governance. Democratic institutions developed for a polity predicated on their absence 
continue to regulate Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples’ relationship to and with 
government. 
 
In this part, I begin the project of rehabilitating Australian democratic practice by displacing 
its presumption of a unitary demos and exploring institutional forms that recognise Australia’s 
plurinational foundations. Grounding Australia’s political and legal governance framework on 
the fact that multiple normative orders exist within the state suggests forms of institutional 
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design that distribute political power across and within Indigenous and non-Indigenous polities 
who share this continent. Drawing on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander aspirations as 
reflected in the Uluru Statement from the Heart and comparative institutional mechanisms from 
across the globe, this part justifies and explores mechanisms of self-rule and shared-rule within 
democratic frameworks. It argues that re-centring Australian democratic practice along these 
lines will empower Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples in a manner consistent with 
democratic ideals. 
 
A. Reconstituting the demos: Uncovering multiple political communities 
 
 
The notion that the Australian state is (or should be) composed of a unified, undifferentiated, 
national community is a powerful one. It accords with the animating ideal of democracy as 
well as the concept that grounds the political (if not legal) legitimacy of the Australian 
government: popular sovereignty.88 Popular sovereignty does not presuppose democratic 
government – a tyrant may claim to represent the will of the people and rule in their name – 
but democracy itself is intimately connected to this amorphous concept, for it is the collective 
will of the people, understood as the ultimate source of political power, that legitimates 
coercively backed decisions.89 Implicit in many conceptions of popular sovereignty then, is an 
understanding of the polity in a unitary sense, as state actions are conceived as the ‘expression 
of a singular people’.90 
 
Uprisings against monarchical rule in the United States and France in the late eighteenth 
century first illustrated that the modern doctrine of popular sovereignty may lead to the 
construction of a unitary demos. Without a sovereign demanding loyalty and obedience, the 
new regimes recognised something else was required to maintain solidarity and cohesion to 
ensure that the people living within their territorial control could imagine themselves as a 
community. The idea of the nation solved this problem,91 by identifying ‘a circumscribed body 
of people bound together by a common custom and capable of being represented by a prince 
or parliament’.92 The ‘instinctive and, in a sense, involuntary accord which springs from like 
feelings and similar opinions’93 of members of the same nation, became seen as a ‘necessary 
condition of [democratic] institutions’.94 
 
Constructing the nation required realising important democratic goals. Legal stratification, 
corporatist social arrangements and hierarchical relationships characteristic of the Middle Ages 
were levelled, establishing, at least in theory, a single-status community.95 In France, for 
example, the Estates-General, whose members had been elected to represent the three estates 
of the realm: the clergy, the nobility, and the commoners, was abandoned in favour of the 
revolutionary National Constituent Assembly, composed entirely by an undifferentiated 
populace. Two months into its existence, the Assembly promulgated the Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and Citizen, pronouncing that ‘the law is the expression of the general will’ and 
‘it must be the same for all’.96 While positive in opening ‘the door to a more broadly 
participatory form of government, based on principles of governmental accountability and 
popular consent’,97 popular sovereignty – and democracy – came to be centred on an ‘undivided 
and all-inclusive community as the basis of a single unified decision-making power’.98 
 
The concept of the ‘the sovereign people’ is therefore not only a manifestation of the authority 
of the citizens of a particular territory, but also a unifying device that can serve to construct a 
monistic and uniform demos. Indeed, as James Tully has argued, invocations of popular 
sovereignty can ‘eliminate…diversity as a constitutive aspect of politics’,99 because to have 
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any weight ‘the people’ must be constructed as ‘culturally homogenous’ in the sense that 
cultural differences are transcended or irrelevant.100 Simone Chambers concurs, noting that ‘the 
people’ have no particular identity, but exist as a generalised ‘distillation of the common points 
of interest shared by all men of good will and reason’.101 The assumption that ‘citizens belong 
indiscriminately to the demos’, Geneviève Nootens has explained, lies ‘at the heart’ of the 
modern doctrine of popular sovereignty and contemporary representative democracy.102 
 
Democratic government does not always rest on a unitary conception of the polity. As Scotland, 
Catalonia, and Quebec demonstrate, extant democratic states can accommodate (albeit with 
some contestation) plural peoples sharing a state. The problem is, however, that democratic 
theorists have traditionally struggled to identify plurinational states and instead have taken the 
unitary demos for granted. As Robert Dahl has explained, the challenge for democratic theorists 
seeking to identify a polity is a conceptual one: before the people can vote to decide who shall 
be included and where the boundaries of the political community shall be placed, they must 
reach consensus over who can take part in the voting in the first place.103 This central difficulty 
has meant that democratic theorists have struggled to explore ‘questions about [democratic 
theory’s] scope’,104 as political philosophers ‘characteristically presuppose that “a people” 
already exists’.105 In fact, many theorists have simply suggested that democratic theory lacks 
the tools to solve this problem, arguing that we should work with historically given solutions,106 
or instead ‘isolate’ this difficulty by focusing on states whose territory is already well-
defined.107 As the previous part demonstrated, however, in Australia this ‘solution’ has led to 
institutional forms that fail to empower peoples not connected to the state-demos. Re-centring 
Australian  democratic practice, begins then, by exploring the problem of ‘constituting the 
demos’.108 In other words, it begins from a simple question: if democracy requires that all 
members of the polity be included in the decision-making process and have an equal 
opportunity to influence the outcome,109 where can the borders of the polity be drawn, and 
where can jurisdictional authority be delineated? 
 
Two major approaches to this problem can be discerned from the literature, distinguished by 
whether they adopt an internal or external lens. First, some scholars, like Kirsty Gover, examine 
democratic theory’s boundary problem by reference to tribal membership of Indigenous 
political communities.110 Gover’s analysis speaks to real challenges facing Indigenous nations 
who seek to maintain control over their community in the face of settler state imposition. Her 
focus is internal, however, and does not suggest an answer to how settler-state legal and 
political processes should be restructured to promote the ability of Indigenous people to have 
a say in settler-government in a manner that allows them to impose a direction on that 
government. 
 
An external focus that explores the relationship between Indigenous nations and the settler-
state in which they live offers greater potential. Unfortunately, many liberal social contract 
theorists addressing the problem of constituting the demos in this way do not engage with the 
position of Indigenous peoples.111 Rather, by reference to, for example, regulatory concerns 
over environmental pollution, they argue for broadening the boundaries of the demos to include 
all people affected by a decision.112 This ‘all-affected’ principle aims at radically democratising 
decision-making globally but has little to directly say about the structure of decision-making 
within plurinational states. 
 
Nevertheless, embers of federalism and sub-state nationalism may be detected and revived 
within this theoretical account. If a case can be made that Indigenous peoples interests are more 
‘relevantly affected’ by certain decisions, then a more restrained all-affected interests principle 
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(perhaps infused with notions of subsidiarity) that matches circles of stakeholders with 
decision-makers,113 suggests specific legal and political processes to ensure those interests are 
heard in decision-making are required. This approach connects with recent scholarly work 
exploring federalism as a way to reconcile Indigenous peoplehood with democratic settler 
states.114 And, significantly, as Dylan Lino has noted, has the added advantage of ‘draw[ing] 
upon and creatively adapt[ing] Australia’s own constitutional traditions’.115 
 
B. Self-rule for Indigenous political communities 
 
A re-centred democratic practice reflective of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples’ 
distinctive position and aspirations is built on the recognition of multiple peoples inhabiting a 
state. Converting Indigenous nationhood into a claim to a ‘more equal citizenship’ by 
enhancing the capacity of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples to be heard in the 
processes of existing institutions of Australian government is necessary, but not sufficient. 
Such an approach remains captive within the assumption of a monistic demos, and, as David 
Temin explains, would merely ‘reproduce the very logic that binds Indigenous peoples to [the] 
violence of replacement via different forms of incorporation into the polity’.116 Instead, a re-
centred democratic practice suggests that counter-majoritarian mechanisms that recognise 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander governance rights over matters that more relevantly affect 
them should be developed.117  
 
Considering the heterogeneity of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities, it is not 
possible to be prescriptive about the extent of self-government powers that could be recognised. 
Differently situated communities will have different aspirations and competencies. Although 
complex, this reality is not indicative of the impossibility of this approach, for, as Patricia 
Monture-Angus has noted, ‘the solution is not about constructing a single (national) model’,118 
but in permitting Indigenous political communities the freedom to self-constitute and negotiate 
the extent of their authority within (a reworked) overarching framework. Matthias Åhrén’s 
‘sliding scale’ of self-determination’119 is helpful in elucidating how this might operate in 
practice. Acknowledging that delineating legal authority and political responsibility between 
Indigenous communities and the state is challenging, Åhrén proposes conceiving jurisdictional 
powers on a scale measuring ‘the relative importance of the issue to the respective people’.120 
As Åhrén explains:  
 
It perhaps makes sense to posit that the more important the issue to the indigenous 
people’s culture, society, and way of life, the greater influence the people should be 
allowed to exercise over the decision-making process. Conversely, if the matter is of 
little significance to the Indigenous people, but important to the welfare of society at 
large, Indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination may only award the Indigenous 
people with limited influence over the decision-making process. Obviously, there are 
also matters in between.121 
 
Åhrén’s sliding scale is consistent with democratic values. As Robert Dahl has explained, 
democracy requires that those affected by a decision are entitled to have an equal say in the 
process used to reach that decision.122 Although democratic theorists have traditionally 
struggled to ascertain who is affected by some matter, or who is more relevantly affected, the 
principle remains clear: Indigenous polities should decide matters in cases where their 
resolution is considered to be more legitimately made by those polities.123 
 
Some examples can be considered. For instance, the UNDRIP provides that Indigenous peoples 
have the right to autonomy or self-government ‘in matters relating to their internal and local 
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affairs’.124 As the Declaration expands upon, this includes the ability to wield greater control 
over land and resources, as well as the authority to maintain, protect, and develop their 
religious, spiritual, and cultural traditions, and establish and control their own educational 
institutions.125 Among other things, in Australia this would empower Indigenous communities 
to choose whether formal educational teaching within their territory is conducted in traditional 
languages or English, or a combination of both. Although the state may be committed to 
ensuring a minimum standard of education, language instruction clearly affects Indigenous 
communities more than the state at large. Democratic theory suggests that agreements should 
be struck between relevant states and territories (who are constitutionally responsible for 
education) and Indigenous communities to embed this right. 
 
Determining what constitutes ‘internal and local affairs’ or what otherwise should be the limits 
within which Indigenous self-rule is exercised may be difficult, but it does not negate the 
democratic right of Indigenous peoples to make decisions within that ambit. It also does not 
infringe the democratic rights of non-Indigenous peoples within the state. Rather, it recognises 
that over certain matters decisions should properly be made by Indigenous peoples themselves. 
It is this principle that properly precludes Australian citizens from voting on issues relating to 
New Zealand agricultural policy, or Victorians from matters ‘internal and local’ to Western 
Australia, and is driving the current push to ban political parties from accepting donations from 
foreign citizens.126 In these cases, the boundaries of the polity are clearly identified: New 
Zealand citizens are more relevantly affected by decisions relating to whether to import certain 
chemicals for agricultural use. Therefore, they are the polity who should be entitled to decide 
the resolution to that matter. 
 
Globally, democratic states are recognising that democratic ideals mandate political or legal 
institutions to provide Indigenous peoples with the authority to exercise self-rule over certain 
matters. The Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (EMRIP) has found that 
such mechanisms are not rare.127 For instance, Indigenous parliaments for the Sámi people exist 
in Norway,128 Sweden,129 and Finland.130 Each representative body differs in competencies, but 
broadly speaking, has administrative powers in certain areas and serves as a standing elected 
body that must be consulted with in all measures that may directly affect the Sámi people. 
Although originally designed as subordinate bodies whose power falls far from true autonomy 
or self-government, these parliaments may have gradually assumed a stronger role. Several 
scholars contend that the Norwegian Sámi Parliament, for example, no longer functions 
primarily as an advisory body but has been able to shift Sámi rights into ‘political demands’,131 
transforming the Sámi people from ‘an interest group’ to ‘a fully formal participant in public 
decision-making processes’.132 Even if these comments are overstated, they suggest that 
institutional forms may evolve to more directly empower Indigenous political communities.  
 
Reflecting the value of federalism as an institutional mechanism to provide for such authority, 
some states recognise autonomous regions whereby territorially concentrated Indigenous 
political communities are able to govern themselves. In Nicaragua for instance, the North 
Caribbean Coast Autonomous Region and the South Caribbean Coast Autonomous Region 
were established in 1987 and elected their first regional governments in 1990. Although the 
central government initially ‘resisted granting any significant decision-making power or funds 
to the regional councils or governments’,133 a successful challenge in the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights by the Awas Tingni to expropriation of their traditional lands without consent, 
propelled action.134 A similar approach has been adopted in Canada and Denmark. In 1999, the 
territory of Nunavut was officially separated from the Northwest Territories, and in 2009 
Greenland gained self-rule from Denmark. While both Nunavut and Greenland adopted a 
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public (rather than ethnic) government, demographics mean that Inuit are a majority within the 
two polities. As such, within these territories, Inuit people exercise real autonomy in prescribed 
areas. In Nunavut, this encompasses, inter alia, legislative powers over the administration of 
justice, sale of land and property rights, education, marriage, and preservation of game,135 while 
in Greenland it extends to authority over judicial affairs, policing, and natural resources.136 
 
In Australia, several mechanisms that recognise and provide for self-government by Indigenous 
polities exist or have existed previously. For example, on territory defined as Aboriginal Land 
under various statutory acts across Australia, Land Councils and Native Title Prescribed Body 
Corporates exercise a limited form of decision-making. Among other functions, Land 
Councils’ must express and protect the interests of traditional owners, conciliate disputes 
between Indigenous people, and hold in trust and distribute payments from mining operations 
under negotiated agreements.137 These two statutory forms have created a ‘carapace’ for 
Indigenous decision-making,138 though one that remains severely limited. These bodies are not 
granted even limited self-governance powers, but rather powers more akin to self-management 
or self-administration. They are designed merely to protect and manage Aboriginal Land or 
native title and ensure certainty for governments and other parties interested in accessing land 
and waters.139 Additionally, they are limited to land defined under those Acts, and therefore 
offer little for Indigenous polities otherwise situated. 
 
ATSIC was not so territorially delimited. As noted in Part II, the Commission had statutory 
authority to ‘formulate and implement policy and programs for’ Indigenous persons.140 As 
issues affecting Indigenous peoples are multifarious and cross-cutting, this permitted the 
Commission to develop policies on a wide breadth of matters. It was well-financed to satisfy 
these responsibilities: in 2002-2003, its final year of operation, ATSIC received around $1.3 
billion from the Commonwealth government.141 During its life, the Commission developed its 
independence from the state in various ways.142 In 1995, it obtained NGO status at the UN, 
providing it an ability to present interests distinct from the Australian government to 
international treaty bodies.143 Similarly, legislation passed in 1993, though deferred until 1 July 
1996, enabled the Commission to elect its own Chair.144 However, while ATSIC was a positive 
step-forward in self-rule for Indigenous polities, it was never intended as an instrument of self-
government but rather ‘a solid foundation’ towards that goal.145 The priorities and policies 
identified by Indigenous representatives remained subject to review by the Minister and 
Parliament, and many scholars have therefore characterised ATSIC as an Indigenous-
controlled ‘government department’,146 rather than a true instantiation of democratic self-rule. 
 
Modern treaties signed between the Canadian state and First Nations give clues as to the scope 
of democratic self-governance that could be recognised in Australia. Eight treaties have been 
negotiated under the British Columbia treaty process and although each is specific to the 
negotiating parties, as well as place, history and circumstance, they share several common 
elements, including governance rights.147 This typically encompasses the administration of 
justice, family and social services, healthcare, and language and cultural education, though 
federal and provincial law applies where an inconsistency or conflict arises.148 The Nisga’a 
Final Agreement was conducted outside the British Columbia process, but it too adopts a 
similar approach. Under the Treaty, the Nisga’a exercise their democratic right to self-rule via 
the Nisga’a Lisims government, 36-member Wilp Si’ayuukhl Nisga’a (legislature) and four 
village councils. Their authority extends over matters that directly affect the identity of the 
Nisga’a nation, including lands, language culture, education, health, child protection, 
traditional healing practice, fisheries, wildlife, forestry, environmental protection and 
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policing.149 Once again, however, notwithstanding the broad ranging jurisdiction, its extent is 
limited in scope: federal and provincial laws apply where an inconsistency or conflict arises.150 
 
That federal and provincial laws apply where an inconsistency or conflict arises can limit the 
democratic right of First Nations polities to determine internal and local matters for themselves, 
though it exists to ensure the central government retains authority to override decisions of its 
political subunits in the interests of the state as a whole.151 As a rule, decisions to override 
Indigenous lawmaking, or indeed lawmaking by any substate polity, should not be taken 
lightly. Rather, the central government should act with respect for the equal status of the 
Indigenous political community as a constituent normative order within the state. While this 
may not be able to be judicially enforceable, a political convention could arise to the effect that 
the government will not intervene or legislate with regard to matters under Indigenous authority 
without the consent of the Indigenous nation.152 In circumstances where the central government 
nonetheless wishes to legislate inconsistently with Indigenous decision-making, the 
government should genuinely consult with the relevant political community, seeking to 
accommodate their position as far as possible. 
 
C. Shared rule across multiple political communities 
 
So far, we have explored self-rule over certain matters for polities within the state as a condition 
of democratic governance. Of course, some other matters will properly be characterised as 
‘relevantly affecting’ multiple polities within the state. Consistent with Åhrén’s sliding scale 
and democratic theory more broadly, these decisions should not be decided solely by an 
Indigenous polity, but by the state at large. This points to the need for some structural interface 
between multiple peoples in which decisions on matters that relevantly affect all members of 
the state (including Indigenous peoples) can be negotiated, adjudicated and enforced.153 
 
The state’s constituent normative communities should be represented in relevant forums of 
decision-making, though the precise institutional arrangement can take multiple 
manifestations. Perhaps the most obvious is a system of reserved seats. More than thirty states 
reserve seats in their national parliaments for representatives of ethno-cultural minorities,154 
while Indigenous peoples have guaranteed representation in New Zealand, Columbia and 
Venezuela.155 Reserved seats are also a condition of federal states, where representation of the 
constituent units of the state is expected, though this is often in upper houses where the 
government of the day is not formed. Dedicated seats can be particularly advantageous for 
numerically small political subunits, as they present the opportunity for members of such 
polities to have their voice heard in the state at large and ‘set the agenda’.156 As Anne Phillips 
has explained, the real value of presence in representative institutions lies in the way it may 
‘transform the political agenda’ by expanding the range of ideas and rendering visible what 
was invisible.157 Encouragingly, limited empirical evidence suggests reserved seats have a 
positive, though modest, effect in strengthening the voice of political minorities.158 Two 
challenges exist in Australia, however: first, affirming the fact that Australia’s system of 
governance is predicated on a unitary demos, a system of reserved seats at the Commonwealth 
level would require constitutional amendment; second, accurately encompassing the scale and 
diversity of several hundred Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander political communities in a 
state or federal Parliament would be difficult. 
 
Alternative or additional extra-Parliamentary arrangements can also be devised. For example, 
Constitutional or Supreme Courts of many states operate under formal or conventional rules 
whereby seats are reserved for justices from different political subunits.159 In Canada, the 
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Supreme Court Act 1985 guarantees at least three (of nine) positions on the Bench to 
individuals from Quebec.160 These seats are only eligible for current members of the Quebec 
bar or Quebec superior courts.161 By convention the other six positions are also divided, albeit 
less rigidly, amongst the provinces.162 In Belgium, the Constitutional Court is composed of 
twelve judges equally divided between two linguistic groups of ‘six Dutch-speaking 
judges…and six French-speaking judges’. In addition, one of the 12 judges must have an 
adequate knowledge of German.163 Each linguistic group selects a President and ‘the 
Presidency of the court as a whole alternates between these two each year’.164 Similarly, in the 
UK, by convention at least one judge from Scotland and one from Northern Ireland always sat 
on the House of Lords, the former ultimate appellate court.165 The Supreme Court of the United 
Kingdom, the successor to the House of Lords, appears to operate under a similar convention. 
The rationale for this convention is the same as that of reserved seats: members of the substate 
unit may be more likely to recognise decisions of the Court as legitimate if a member of their 
community is present in the forum of decision-making. Certainly, reserving a seat for an 
Indigenous justice may better incorporate Indigenous traditions into the Australian common 
law, leading to a more equitable overarching shared-rule framework and increasing the 
legitimacy of the law in the eyes of Indigenous peoples. 
 
ATSIC was an innovative attempt at including Indigenous peoples within shared-rule 
institutions. Under s 7 of the ATSIC Act, the Commission was required to ‘advise the Minister’ 
on matters relating to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander affairs, as well as develop policy 
and implement programs for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders. While the Minister was 
not ‘restricted to, nor bound by the advice received’,166 this statutory right provided ‘significant 
advantages’ to the Commission, relative to the multiplicity of Indigenous organisations across 
the country,167 as it guaranteed Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples’ the capacity to 
have their interests heard in the processes of government via representatives of their choice. In 
fact, ATSIC not only had the authority to directly advise the Minister, but, when requested, 
could provide co-ordination comments on Cabinet submissions – a right no other group held.168  
 
Nonetheless, in practice, the government often chose to ignore ATSIC’s advice, and reports 
indicated ‘a significant decline over time in ATSIC’s input and access to the Cabinet policy 
development process’.169 Concern that ATSIC’s value and role as an institutional arrangement 
designed to empower Indigenous peoples in shared-decision-making was waning catalysed 
various proposals to expand the Commission’s standing. These included proposals to make 
ATSIC’s Chairperson ‘a full member of the Ministerial Council on Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Affairs’,170 or a member of the Council of Australian Governments.171 ATSIC itself 
recommended legislation providing the Chairperson with the right: to observer status in 
Parliament; to speak to either House on bills affecting Indigenous interests; and, to make an 
annual report to the nation on Indigenous affairs.172 ATSIC also considered that reserved seats 
at both the Commonwealth and state level, ward structures in local government areas with 
significant Aboriginal communities, and greater Indigenous representation on local councils 
would assist in this project.173 None of these proposals were adopted during ATSIC’s existence. 
 
Most recently, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people have expressed support for a 
constitutionally entrenched representative body empowered to give First Nations a voice in 
laws that affect them.174 Although details have not been finalised, in most accounts, the body 
would be constitutionally enshrined, and empowered to advise Parliament on all matters 
affecting Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. The advice would be tabled in 
Parliament and considered by both Houses when debating proposed laws. It would, however, 
be non-binding and non-justiciable. In the absence of any national Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
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Islander institution, a First Nations Voice along these lines would be beneficial; enabling 
Indigenous Australians to have their voices heard over matters that affect them. And yet, in the 
absence of mechanisms of self-rule, the body would not be sufficient on this rehabilitated 
account of democratic theory; Indigenous Australians would remain unable to decide matters 
for themselves. That said, the First Nations Voice could complement institutional arrangements 
of self-rule at the local and community level. 
 
Notwithstanding the multiplicity of shared-rule arrangements, some academics have 
questioned whether there is a tension between assertions of Indigenous sovereignty and 
participation in shared-rule institutions. For instance, Will Kymlicka has noted that the right to 
self-government is ‘a right against the authority of the federal government, not a right to share 
in the exercise of that authority’.175 Similarly, Alexander Reilly has suggested that advocacy 
for specific Indigenous representation in Parliament is ‘at odds’ with calls for greater self-
government arrangements.176 Echoing this, Melissa Williams explains that enhanced 
representation in mainstream Canadian legislative institutions ‘has not, by and large, been a 
goal of Aboriginal leaders or scholars in Canada, primarily because it appears to stand at odds 
with the more important goal of Aboriginal self-government’.177  
 
If these views are premised on Indigenous peoples seeking secession, then they are correct. 
Only the most radical boundary theorists would suggest, for example, that Australians should 
have any direct influence on New Zealand agriculture law and policy. If Indigenous polities 
secede from the state, there is little accepted democratic justification for their presence on 
mechanisms of shared rule. As noted above, however, while some Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander people may advocate secession, many have more moderate aims. As the Uluru 
Statement from the Heart indicates, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples argue that 
their (spiritual) sovereignty ‘co-exists with the [legal] sovereignty of the Crown’, and as such, 
they seek structural reforms to ‘empower our people and take a rightful place’ within the 
state.178 These are not secessionist goals. Even Michael Mansell, former Secretary of the 
Aboriginal Provisional Government, accepts that Aboriginal people are ‘not entitled to 
secession’179 under international law, nor in a position to demand ‘full-blown self-
determination’.180  
 
Participation in institutions of shared-rule is thus not at odds with Indigenous assertions of 
sovereignty but is reflective of a democratic theory receptive and sensitive to the fact of 
multiple peoples. As the New Zealand Royal Commission on Electoral Systems explained in 
1986, representation of the rights and interests of a numerically smaller polity is ‘essential’ for 
two reasons.181 First, like a shield, their participation provides a measure of protection, ensuring 
that existing domains of self-rule are not threatened, or like ATSIC, abolished. Second, like a 
sword, participation is required because they are relevantly affected by economic and social 
policies enacted by the central government. Failure to have their interests heard will therefore 
affect the normative legitimacy of the decision. In this second dimension, participation in 
shared-rule institutions aims at ensuring ‘a broader goal of self-government’,182 and ‘advancing 
Indigenous self-determination by targeting a variety of parallel and complementary access 
points to political power’.183 The presence of Indigenous representatives on shared rule 
institutions not only permits direct participation in decision-making processes, but offers 
meaningful opportunities to contest power otherwise wielded by non-Indigenous peoples.184 
Of course, in multinational states, Indigenous peoples will not be successful in every issue but 
their voice must be heard.185 
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Hearing Indigenous peoples’ voices requires genuine institutions of shared rule. As Dale 
Turner explains this does not mean simply incorporating Indigenous peoples into existing 
settler-state institutions, but restructuring those institutions so as they ‘accommodate and 
respect Aboriginal voices on their own terms’.186 Morgan Brigg and Lyndon Murphy make a 
similar point, warning us not to ‘wrongly interpret the simple participation of Indigenous 
people [in settler-state institutions] as evidence of the expression of Indigenous ideas and 
values’.187 Although a bicultural interaction ‘might occur’, if it is premised on ‘only one set of 
political values and ideas’,188 it will likely fail to do justice to the rights and interests of 
Indigenous peoples. As these scholars identify, institutional procedures within the shared-rule 
framework are critical because those procedures shape how debate is conducted, and in so 
doing shape the terms of that debate.  
 
These interventions caution against unreflective amendments to shared-rule institutions. For 
instance, reserving a number of seats in the Australian Parliament for Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander peoples is justifiable on a democratic theory re-centred on the fact of multiple 
polities, but it would not be sufficient. While it would constitute a step forward, ensuring 
representatives accountable to Indigenous peoples are present in the shared law-making forum 
and providing greater opportunity for Indigenous interests to be heard on legislation that 
relevantly affects Indigenous peoples, their ability to disseminate Indigenous ideas and values 
would be limited. Absent additional changes to the structure or norms of the Australian 
Parliament, dedicated Indigenous Parliamentarians would merely ‘constitute a minority in the 
institution of the majority’.189 Consistent with a robust and equitable democratic theory, 




Audra Simpson has argued that political science has not been able to ‘harness[] the conceptual 
tools to engage the possibility of Indigenous nationhood; nor could [it] do it in ways that were 
consistent with the words and actions of the subjects’.190 Australia’s democratic governance 
framework is similarly impoverished in this regard, unable to comprehend Indigenous 
assertions of sovereignty that challenge the presumed unitary demos. It is not unsalvageable, 
however. Recognition of plural wills within a postcolonial state; what Fiona MacDonald calls 
democratic multinationalism,191 and Duncan Ivison refers to as ‘constellations of normative 
orders’,192 is supportive of legal and political institutions and processes to provide Indigenous 
peoples’ with the capacity to have their interests heard in the processes of government. 
Consistent with democratic theory, on – at the very least – matters ‘internal and local’, 
Indigenous peoples’ interests should take precedence. Within this jurisdictional ambit they are, 
if they so choose, entitled to maintain analytically distinct legal and normative orders of self-
rule. For other matters, Indigenous peoples’ interests should be considered as part of a shared-
rule framework where all polities within the state can be heard. Establishing institutions to 
embed this structural relationship for each First Nation across Australia may require some 
imaginative thinking, but this does not negate the moral force of their claims. 
 
Part of the challenge is the absence of a foundational theory, practice, or act, that can facilitate 
this change in Australia. In Canada, Aotearoa/New Zealand, and the United States, historic 
treaties serve as an example of the institutional arrangements explored in this paper; a model 
based on the equal sharing of political power. Of course, those historic treaties were generally 
ignored by the state but their existence betrays an alternative path and scholarly and activist 
effort at recovering and implementing the procedural and substantive principles that were 
embedded in those treaties reveals their continuing force.193 Early efforts towards treaty-
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making in Western Australia, Victoria, and the Northern Territory, suggest displacing the 
unitary demos and re-centring Australia’s democratic foundations may be possible. If 
substantive agreements are eventually reached, institutional arrangements that distribute 
political power across and within distinct normative communities may eventuate.194 
 
Recognising the plurality of Australian society and establishing institutions to express those 
distinctions is important, but it should not come at the expense of a shared identity. While in 
the Uluru Statement, First Nations called on non-Indigenous Australians to ‘walk with us in a 
movement of the Australian people for a better future’, future research should investigate how 
Australian citizenship may be reconceptualised in a manner that accepts Indigenous 
peoplehood.195 The goal is a society in which ‘democratic self-government is distributed in 
such a way that citizens “participate concurrently in different collectivities”’,196 while also 
participating within the overarching state. Multinational federalism suggests one way that this 
can be realised. 
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